Search by party name, citation, or a phrase from the judgment and move straight to the right volume.
Access noteResults only include content available on your current tier. If you do not have full case access, results from restricted case content will not appear.
Sign in to continue browsing Zimbabwe Law Reports.
Search by party name, citation, or a phrase from the judgment and move straight to the right volume.
Access noteResults only include content available on your current tier. If you do not have full case access, results from restricted case content will not appear.
Sign in to continue browsing Zimbabwe Law Reports.
Employment — Labour Court — jurisdiction — exclusive jurisdiction in labour matters — no jurisdiction to provide common law remedies — vindicatory action arising out of labour dispute — High Court having jurisdiction
Pursuant to disciplinary proceedings brought against him by his employer, the applicant company, the respondent was found guilty of the various charges of misconduct and dismissed from his employment. He noted an appeal to the Labour Court against his dismissal. He refused to return a motor vehicle that had been allocated to him. The vehicle was owned by the company. The company's vehicle policy stated that the vehicle user would be given the first option to purchase the vehicle at disposal time and that the purchase price would be set by the executive committee, reviewed as necessary. The applicant brought a vindicatory action against him.
The respondent argued (a) that the matter was a labour dispute which fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court; and (b) that he had a claim of right to the motor vehicle emanating from the applicant's company car scheme and that this claim of right had not been extinguished by the termination of his contract of employment, because his appeal against that termination was still pending before the Labour Court.
Held, that in terms of s 89(1)(a), as read with s 89(6), of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], the Labour Court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction, at first instance, in relation to all matters that may be classified as purely labour disputes, such as suspension from employment and termination of employments contracts. However, this was an application for vindication of the applicant's property. The actio rei vindicatio cannot be termed to be a purely labour remedy which falls under the exclusive purview of the Labour Act. The Labour Court, being a creature of statute, may only do that which it is expressly authorized to do. The High Court, having inherent jurisdiction, may do anything except that which it is expressly prohibited from doing. There is no exclusive provision of the Act which expressly authorizes the Labour Court to adjudicate in matters involving the actio rei vindicatio, which is a common law remedy. There is nothing in the Labour Act which expressly ousts the High Court's jurisdiction in regard to matters which have aspects of labour disputes but in which common law remedies are sought.
Held, further, that the clear effect of the vehicle policy was to allow the applicant a discretion as whether or not to offer the vehicle to its employee, at a price to be determined by a committee within the company. This had not been done at the time that the respondent was suspended, or at the time that he was dismissed, from employment. The respondent thus never acquired a right to purchase the motor vehicle and no claim of right arose. A legitimate expectation does not amount to a claim of right.
Held, further, that the noting of an appeal to the Labour Court did not suspendthe decision to dismiss the respondent.
Sign in or create a free account — you get 2 full-case reads included.