NYAHORA v CFI HOLDINGS (PVT) LTD 2014 (2) ZLR 607 (S)

Flynote

Court — Labour Court — jurisdiction — limits to jurisdiction — relief sought not specifically set out in Labour Act — right of party to seek relief from High Court

Employment — contract — termination — rights of employee after termination of contract — right to retain or buy company car — unless contract specifically gives right to employee, car remains property of employer

Headnote

The High Court is a superior court with inherent jurisdiction. There is a presumption against the ouster of the jurisdiction of a court unless this is clearly the intention of the legislature. The exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court by s 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] relates only to the hearing and determination, in the first instance, of any application, appeal or matter referred to in subsection (1). Subsection (1)(a) in turn clearly limits that jurisdiction to applications and appeals in terms of the Act or any other enactment. Instances in which applications and appeals may be made in terms of the Act are clearly set out in the Act. These include the applications referred to in ss 92C and 93(7). These being applications in terms of the Act, no other court has jurisdiction to hear or determine such applications at first instance.

Applications or appeals in terms of "any other enactment" would be limited to those pieces of legislation that specifically provide for an application or an appeal to be made to the Labour Court. An example would be the Public Service (General Conditions of Service) Regulations SI 1 of 2000, which makes reference to an appeal to the Labour Court against a decision of the Public Service Commission.

The right of an individual to approach the High Court seeking relief, other than that specifically set out in s 89(1)(a) of the Act, has not been abrogated. Nothing in s 89(6) takes away the right of an employer or an employee to seek civil relief based on the application of pure principles of civil law, except in respect of those applications and appeals that are specifically provided for in the Labour Act. Nor is there contained in s 89 any provision expressly authorizing the Labour Court to deal with an application for the common law remedy of rei vindicatio. Such applications fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the High Court.

The actio rei vindicatio is available to an owner of property who seeks to recover it from a person in possession of it without his consent. It is based on the principle that an owner cannot be deprived of his property against his will. He is entitled to recover it from any one in possession of it without his consent. He has merely to allege that he is the owner of the property and that it was in the possession of the defendant/respondent at the time of commencement of the action or application. If he alleges any lawful possession at some earlier date by the defendant then he must also allege that the contract has come to an end. The claim can be defeated by a defendant who pleads a right of retention or some contractual right to retain the property.

In most cases where an employee has the use of a company car, the option granted by the employer to purchase the car after a given time is a privilege accorded to its employees, perhaps in the hope that this will induce loyal service, as well as a culture of caring for the company property or some other reason beneficial to the employer/company. Therefore, unless the contract specifically states so, a court ought to be careful not to read a legal right into a policy matter which is for the discretion of the employer. The question of a right to purchase could only arise after an offer had been made to, and accepted by, the employee to purchase the vehicle and not before. Unless such a contract is formed, the employee has no right to retain the vehicle if his employment with the company ceases.